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Abstract
The accession of Hungary to the European Union is a complex procedure. The harmonisation of
the environment protection is an important part of that. According to the dominant interpretation
this aspect implies the adaptation to the EU directives and regulations, and the harmonisation of the
environmental programmes.
The environmental programme of the EU is well characterized by its title ‘Towards Sustain-
ability’. The present study examined the situation of the Hungarian environmental regulation and the
extent of the environmental policy harmonises with that of the EU.
Keywords: environmental regulation, EU accession.
1. Introduction
In the accession to the European Union, the harmonisation of Hungarian envi-
ronmental regulations will have an important share. Since the weight of economic
regulators in the European regulations is growing continuously special care must be
expended to environmental charges, fees and generally to the ‘greening’ of taxation.
Analyses, carried out in the beginning of the 90’s, showed that environmental
charges and fees have become more and more important in Hungarian environmen-
tal regulation. From the above fact one can conclude that the Hungarian environ-
mental policy harmonises with the European one. Furthermore, this holds true for
environmental legislation and environmental policies and programmes.
In the mid 90’s, new tendencies appeared in the environmental policy and
economics of the European Union, pointing beyond the efforts of Hungarian envi-
ronmental regulations. These initiatives have ‘planted’ the green aspects into the
evolution of the integration more distinctly, reforming that as an integral part of the
whole process, thus we may talk about green or ‘greening-like’ taxation. This sort
of greening taxation does not solely levy further and more strict charges or create
greater environmental funds but understands the term in a more general way: cuts
the subsidies and tax-decrees boosting negative externalities and the changing of
the structure of the taxation.
The above mentioned modification aims to measure the complex effects of
environmental regulations and considers the incentive effect of profit as much as
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its redistribution effects. Numerous analysis and modelling proved already that
the same eco-tax may improve or spoil the efficiency, depending on the induced
income-restructuring.
Ecological policies and environmental regulations must be thus examined
from the viewpoint of inner structure and relationship, economic and social effects,
and international relations. International harmonisation is especially important due
to its competitiveness and capital allocation.
Regarding the Hungarian accession, it must be emphasised that from the en-
vironmental regulations point of view although we are in harmony with the practice
of the European Union but with the new efforts of the late ‘90s.
Environmental aspects must be integrated into the economic, political and
societal texture, and from this respect Hungary has a lot to do during the joining
process.
Main environmental regulation initiatives of the European Union and the
Hungarian practice. The definitions of the elements of the environmental regula-
tion system (including eco-taxes and fees) to be used are following the Hungarian
nomenclature. Note, that though these definitions are based upon international pub-
lications and documents, due to their multi-dimensional use the definitions are not
universal. Simply because no universal definition of these terms exists. The Eu-
ropean Union has a close co-operation with EUROSTAT, the International Energy
Agency and OECD in order to provide the sufficient frame to the eco-taxation of the
member states. It is considered to be important to provide a uniform background,
which creates the opportunity to compare and to analyse the data of the individual
countries.
The employment of economic tools in the environmental regulation in the
European Union became stronger from the 80’s; in the beginning in the form of
introducing different environmental charges and fees.
From the 90’s, a new epoch has started in the area of eco-taxation in the
European Union (and naturally in many OECD countries). While during the 80’s
eco-taxation developed almost fully isolated from general taxation, in the 90’s it
has become a more or less integrated part of that. The introduction of new forms
of charges has been replaced by the strengthening tendencies of greening the entire
taxation itself.
The process of greening the taxation has been happening in three phases,
which at the same time interrelate and complete each other:
1. changing or abolishment of the distorting subsidies and tax-decrees;
2. restructuring the existing tax forms;
3. introduction of new eco-taxes.
2. Changing or Abolishment of the Distorting Subsidies and Tax-Decrees
It is a general requirement, stated in an international document, that the different
tax forms, tax-orders and subsidies (both direct and indirect forms) should not have
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any negative environmental impacts. This is at least as important as introducing
new eco-taxes.
The crucial part is the negative impacts of the direct subsidies. (Based on the
decision of the General Assembly of the G7 in 1995, Hamilton, the methodology
is now under investigation how to explore and evaluate these sorts of subsidies.)
These subventions play an important role mainly in agricultural, energy and
transport sectors. In many cases activities with major negative externalities are
subsidised, contrary to the proposed system of Pigue, which would only support
activities with positive externalities. These supports distort the situation tremen-
dously, amplifying the harmful effects of negative externalities exponentially. The
impact of subsidies to the selection of products and services is already proved.
The following few examples will illustrate the above mentioned statements.
Industry, energy sector: subsidies supporting the exploitation of stocks and
promoting energy use have negative effects on recycling and amplify waste produc-
tion. The subsidies in the energy sector favour the polluting (‘black’) users over
green ones.
Transport: only part of the real costs is paid by the users (according to some
estimates, on EU level this is around 80% of the total price). The subsidies of this
sector support vehicular traffic, which is well-known to be more environmentally
destructive than railways or water traffic. These subsidies entirely contradict real
economic effects. Considering externalities, the supporting of the extension and the
use of road network is only justified if positive externalities dominate. Today, sup-
porting road constructions and vehicular traffic, we subsidise products and services
with negative net balance. This is a typical example of the previously mentioned
double harmful effect.
Agriculture: agricultural subsidies cannot be uniformly judged. If agriculture
is understood as the type of activity that is in harmony with Nature, subsidies have
positive effects. However, if the sector is defined as an industry-like production
using fertilisers and pesticides extensively and decreasing biodiversity, the total
effect is negative.
Most of the above mentioned examples portray the negative aspects of subsi-
dies. Although they can be justified from both environmental and economic view-
point if they support the effects of positive externalities and promote the optimal
level of social externalities promoted.
I think that the latter type of subsidies will not solely conform with the theory
of ecological economy, but with the principles and expectations of the European
Union. Thus the subsidies satisfying the above criteria can be adapted to the practice
of the future ecological policy.
3. Restructuring the Existing Tax Forms
Under this heading mainly the restructuring of taxes distorting environmental values
is understood. Although most charges have positive effects on environment (e.g.
differentiation of tax level according to the lead content of petrol), others are often
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the causes of environmentally harmful mistakes. (To mention a few examples, the
lowering of tax rates to promote the draining of wetlands to use them for agricultural
purposes, or in case of traffic the lower tax level of diesel fuel favouring vehicle
transportation. Hardly any arguments support today the tax free or low tax state of
aircraft kerosene.)
The restructuring of present taxation is manageable in an environmentally
friendly way. This approach aims to levy taxes gradually on the most polluting
activities, influencing their relative price.
Besides the previously mentioned differentiation of the fuel taxes based on
the lead content, several member states of the European Union restructured their
car related taxes (maintenance and marketing taxes) to promote the use of the least
polluting ones.
Since energy is the major source of both tax incomes and pollution, restruc-
turing energy taxation and energy prices are rather promising options. However,
regarding the difficulties of implementation and the various effects it may have, the
question requires detailed analysis. Changes of customer attitude are derived by
many factors: the situation in the taxation, relation of fuel prices and income, the
choice of the different options, etc. The final effect determines the behaviour of
producers, whose activity is thus oriented towards a less polluting (and a less taxed)
product.
4. Introduction of New Eco-Taxes
Starting from the 90’s the number eco-tax rates have grown significantly in the EU
countries. Table1 indicates these figures.
Introducing environmental charges happens in an income neutral context,
in most cases that is other taxes become lower when eco-taxes come into effect.
Introducing new taxation in a package is much easier–due to income neutrality–
from societal acceptance point of view. To lower the overall levy is an imaginable
option, since such reforms would meet the general requirements of the public. In
this case, however, other (e.g. social) expenses should be lowered and the cost
should be shifted upon the population, resulting massive resistance thus inhibiting
the introduction of the new tax system. (In this respect great differences can be
identified between the USA and the EU countries.) Lately, the idea that income
taxes or even property taxes could be lowered by introducing new green taxation
attracts attention in the European Union member states.
In the following, a couple of examples will be described, more detailed:
• In 1991, Sweden started a new tax reform, affecting 6% of the country’s
GDP. The general aim was to lower the number of distorting taxes and tax
distortions mentioned above. In order to keep the income tax concentration
on the former level, some direct taxes had to be raised and a couple of new
eco-taxes had to be introduced (CO2 and NOX were taxed).
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Table 1. The changing of the number of financial means ∗ in seven OECD member states,
1987–97
Countries 1987 1992 1997
Finland 10 16 22
France 6 7 12
Germany 9 10 13
Italy 5 5 6
the Netherlands 13 11 16
Norway 12 15 22
Sweden 13 17 21
Source: data for 1987, 1992: Managing the environment: The Role of Economic Instruments. OECD,
Paris, 1994.
Data for 1997: Environmental Charges and Green Tax Reform. OECD, Paris, 1997.
∗Financial means are referring here to emission charges, product charges, marketable permits, and
implementation incentives.
• In Denmark, an extensive tax reform was initiated in 1994. A key element of
the initiative was to promote environmental preferences and a more rational
use of natural resources. Since 1996, energy used by the industry has been
levied by new green charges (CO2, SO2), and till 2000 the rate of the taxes
grew gradually. The returns of these charges were redrawn to the industry to
finance energy saving investments and to lower the social insurance rate of
employers.
• Green taxes were subject to long and dramatic changes in the Netherlands
between 1971 and 1996. Starting from a separated and distinguished green
tax form, in the 90’s the taxation itself moved toward a green approach. It is
important to note that the revenues of eco-taxes are part of the overall budget.
From 1996, new ‘energy regulating charge’ came into force, levied to small
consumers (like households, smaller ventures, offices). Revenues from eco-
taxes are returned to the household sector in the forms of lowered income tax
and social insurance.
• The planned Finnish tax reform will significantly lower the employers’ ex-
penses (income tax and social insurance rate). The deficit will be covered by
the higher energy-charges and new eco-taxes.
Eco-taxes are not yet understood in their entirety, though experiences mostly
confirm their effective operation. The assumption of the effectiveness is confined
by some factors; namely:
• eco-taxes are combined with other environmental means,
• eco-taxes co-effect with other economic regulators,
92 J. SZLÁVIK
• hence it is rather difficult to separate that from the effect of technological
changes, efficiency improvements and environmentally friendly structural
changes.
Since some of the countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway) regularly
examine these effects, it is worthwhile to follow and consider them.
Regarding the returns of the eco-taxes reliable calculations are already avail-
able. In a study, published in 1996, the European Union and EUROSTAT examined
the structure of taxation of the EU countries. (The study examined the period be-
tween 1980 and 1993, including all of the taxes having any kind of environmental
objective.) Compared to the GDP, the rate of energy related and environment related
charges of the 15 member states grew from 2.1% to 2.7% between 1980 and 1993.
Considering the overall tax revenue, the share of these taxes was 5.7% and 6.7%
in 1980 and 1993, respectively. There are certainly countries, where the figure was
higher. In Norway1, the share of environment related taxes was 5.9% and 8.2% in
1980 and 1992, respectively.
From the above example it is clearly visible that though eco-taxes take only
a minor fraction of the taxes, they represent a growing revenue of the EU member
states.
5. The Harmony of Hungarian and EU Regulations
Comparing the basic environmental policies and the available means of Hungary
and that of the European Union, the two harmonise in many areas. The underlying
reason is that during the codification of the Hungarian Environmental Act, enacted
in 1995, the bill was heavily relying on the fifth action programme of the European
Union, published in 1992, ‘Towards Sustainability’. (The analysis of the bill from
sustainability point of view was carried out first by the same team which investigated
the bill from economics’ perspective: KEREKES, KINDLER, KOLOSZÁR, SZLÁVIK
and TÓTH in 1993.)
The Hungarian National Environmental Programme (1996) is based on EU
recommendations as well. At the time of the codification, Hungary was already
OECD member; furthermore, as an EU associate member, the government was
preparing to start the joining negotiations. However, beyond the general statements,
the conformation of the two regulations is definitely not so obvious.
Look at the regulation side first.
To characterise the gradually greening taxation of the EU, the following three
features are selected:
1. changing or abolishment of the distorting subsidies and tax-decrees;
1Though Norway is not EU member, its environmental policy is rather similar to that of other
Scandinavian EU member states, thus the above figures are presumably valid for those countries as
well.
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2. restructuring existing charges;
3. introduction of new eco-taxes.
Out of these three, from the 90’s the Hungarian environmental policy is fo-
cusing on the regulations, favours the various economic means and tries to bring it
to the front. From this perspective, the policy harmonises with the ‘Union’ part of
Europe, or to be more precise the ‘Community’ part, since this tendency is more
alike the preferences of the European Community in the 80’s.
The Hungarian environmental policy has made decisive and noteworthy steps
(in the fields of both regulations and environmental programmes) in order to define
itself in a way which harmonises with the definition of the EU and the OECD. So
far–though in a separate form, as environmental policy–it was successful.
One important step, featuring in the EU programme and implementation,
the break-through, is still delayed. This feature is the effectiveness that makes
environmental considerations an effective part of the entire economy and practice.
Hungarian efforts mainly aim to tie as many resources as possible (the former
Central Environmental Fund [KKA] has been recently replaced by the Environ-
mental Target Fund [KAC]) to the hand of the government through environmental
fees and charges, and the Ministry (involving various environmental NGOs) will
redistribute them.
This effort exists parallel to the national taxation, having no influence upon
that. In today’s Hungary it is unrealistic to restructure the taxation along envi-
ronmental values in Scandinavian style: ‘eco-taxes for environment and for better
employment’.
The agenda does not even include the main aspect of the 90’s of the European
Union: the restructuring and/or abatement of the distorting systems and the entire
taxation.
6. Analysis of the Economic and Societal Principles of the Hungarian
Environmental Regulations
Let us now review the Hungarian environmental regulation system from different
angles. These means are practical to be looked at from the following perspectives:
• static and dynamic effectiveness, competitiveness;
• simplicity of control and execution, information need;
• flexibility in adaptation to economic changes;
• political considerations, societal acceptance.
7. Static and Dynamic Effectiveness, Competitiveness
By static we understand weather the pollution control is carried out by the given
technology and the geological position; that is whether it is typical ‘end of pipe’ (or
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extensive) environment protection. Effectiveness is measured by the overall costs
of the polluter that it must spend in order to realise the targeted control mechanism.
To decide how effective the given regulation mean is, the overall cost of the emission
control must be taken into account.
According to the above mentioned criteria, taxes function more efficiently
than norms. If emission lowering fee is introduced for every kg of dispersed SO2,
then every polluter will reduce the emission as long as the marginal cost of the
emission lowering is not equal to the fee. The uniform fee (or in case of tradable
permits2: the price of the permit) assures that in case of many polluters, the marginal
cost of the last unit of avoided emission will be equal. This will also assure that the
efforts are made at the least cost.
If similar effectiveness is to be achieved by norms, different values must be
assigned to every single pollution reduction curve. This would be the only solution
to assure the equal level of marginal costs of each polluting source at any given
emission level. This method is more tiresome and less secure than settling a fair
tax or fee.
The examination of dynamic effectiveness is a typical incentive of intensive
or preventive environment protection. Dynamic effectiveness includes long term
action plans which are supported by the applied means, such as recommendation to
polluters for technology changes (production or pollution-minimisation technolo-
gies) or moving the industry to less endangered area. It is an important criterion
of any implemented mean to support and urge the polluters to install advanced
technology or to minimise actual damages.
Charges and fees can be effectively used for the same purpose, due to their
incentive nature. The charge or fee to be paid reminds polluters continuously (and
at the right time) that decreasing the amount of pollution will lower his costs as
well. Unthoughtful introduction of norms though may significantly slow the rate
of innovations, thus behaves as ‘innovation brake’.
Once the environmental fees are settled, because of cost minimisation, it is
the polluters’ interest to reach the optimum level of pollution as soon as possible.
Norms will not be complied with as long as breaking the law is not punished. Often
negotiations start and effectiveness of the regulation decreases.
Analysing the effectiveness of the system competitiveness must be examined
too. However, competitiveness of norms is a rather complex concept, and the com-
petitiveness of individual corporations, the various sectors or national economies
must be clearly separated from one another.
Examining the effects of a regulation, effects on the entire economy are more
important than effects on the various sectors. (Regarding the Hungarian acces-
sion negotiations the final question is how the international competitiveness of the
country will change.)
2Tradable permits is a method typically used in the United States and not in the European Union.
The reason we mention this regulation mean is its possible application, recommended in many ne-
gotiations and political debates, in case of the international regulation of greenhouse gases. Expert
evaluation would be necessary in relation to the development of the Hungarian regulations as well.
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Concerning the effects to the corporations, great differences might be expe-
rienced within any given sector. An emission fee or tax has different effect on the
company, depending on what state of the ‘lifecycle’ its activity is. If the company
just considers to implement a new investment, a newly introduced carbon/energy
charge may result in the amelioration of the environmental conditions and the com-
pany’s efficiency at the same time. However, the situation changes tremendously,
if the investment is already settled, and another technology shift would be difficult
and expensive.
An environmental charge endangers the competitiveness of an industry where
parties compete with the quality of their products less (pharmacy industry) than of
a sector where they compete merely with prices (fossil fuels).
The nature of the industry determines the problem of moving as well. If
a regional regulation changes, it gets strict and compliance is costly, a company
heavily relying on labour force will move much easily than the one based on fixed
assets.
The effects of environmental charges are influenced by the way and the area
the revenues are used for. According to an estimation of the European Union (1994),
if the returns of the carbon charges were used for lowering the social insurance fee
of the employers, both GDP and employment rate would grow on the long run. At
the same time studies showed that carbon charges can lower GDP, if repartition
is incorrect. Applying ‘GREEN’ model of OECD, in case of the EU, the GDP
dropped by 0.6% compared to the previous situation where taxes were returned to
the economy based on flat rate.
Model experiments and experiences prove that eco-taxes (or similar measures)
do not acerbate the competitiveness of companies, industrial branches and nations.
Long term competitiveness of countries does not worsen, indeed, may ameliorate if
environmental regulations encourage the better employment of natural resources.
It does not mean, though, that a strict environmental order would not cause
headache to certain companies or industrial sectors. The effect is even worse if
countries do not introduce their regulations accordantly. Certain situations may
force companies to move away completely. Referring to Hungary, this means that
the country should not run ahead sharpening its regulations. However, if we lag
behind or our regulations become too soft, EU is going to warn us, since it would
contradict to the strict, polluter pays principle (PPP), and would encourage the
undesirable capital-shift.
Complex effects of the Hungarian environmental regulations cannot be uni-
vocally judged, based on the available and rather simple analyses. The new bills are
supported by profit/loss calculations and implementation analyses but the results,
due to vague data and the lack of detailed and partial empirical examinations, show
large uncertainty, hence no tendency can be outlined.
That is why these analyses must be carried out in a later part of the research
and during the negotiations. It is a definite drawback that both the incentive effect
and the redistribution effect of the regulations are vaguely known. Though good
algorithm for the redistribution mechanisms exists for a long time, but without
serious effectiveness-analysis.
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8. Simplicity of Control and Execution, Information Need
This criterion measures what sort of data should be at the pollution control author-
ities disposal at what level of the forecast model to be able to use the given tool.
This requirement of the effectiveness becomes important, when many polluters
harm nature in different ways.
The use of each tool assumes that the abatement cost function, the pollution
cost function and the revenue function are well known, since the optimal emission
level and the adequate marginal cost can be derived only if these are available. In
case of charges and fees, compared to norms, efficiency can be achieved with less
information.
I reckon a noteworthy problem that in Hungary the changed property forms,
corporation size and the technology shift are followed by the information system
with large delay. Thus trustworthy information is missing for proper regulations
and to prepare reliable profit/loss curves.
As we all know, every regulation tool basically aims to channel the polluters
towards optimal level of externalities. However, if charges, fees and norms are
based upon incorrect information, either pollution will exceed the economically
efficient level, or–holding the externalities back–the profit margin will not reach
the economic optimum.
Though information requirement of the system is much lower if taxes are
levied if norms are introduced, to hold back productions with rapidly growing
dangers (steeply growing externality level) can only be accomplished by a regulation
system based on strict norms.
During the accession to the European Union the information system must
be developed both structurally and qualitatively due to its rational establishment
and practical operation. We believe, that overall adaptation to the EU information
system must be carried out preferably already during the negotiation phase.
Environmental data, if provided in inadequate structure, may turn out to be
disadvantageous for the negotiating party. (It is well-known that the answers pro-
vided to the EU questioners had similar consequences due to the ill structure, and
caused drawbacks to the country.)
9. Flexibility in Adaptation to Economic Changes
Flexibility means that after economic changes (such as rise of prices, inflation or
industrial boom), the used economic means help the easy adaptation to the new
situation, and the desirable environmental policies can be realised. Wide-range
flexibility also means that the affected polluters can take the necessary measures
individually. If the level of flexibility is low, the controlling authorities will be forced
to ceaselessly re-calculate and re-arrange the regulations and the orders. This infers
the renewing of the expensive data gathering and administrative measures, opens
the possibility of political interference and lobbying.
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Charges and fees are less flexible than tradable permits. Still, revising the
uniform tax rates or changing the fees are much easier than reviewing the norms,
since latter one affects legislation and thus the contracts negotiated with the indi-
vidual polluters. This way, especially high inflation and prolonged governmental
interference may degrade normative fines down to symbolic level. It is thus im-
portant to harmonise norms and fees of the different regulations in the regulation
process more thoroughly.
Introducing new regulatory tools it would be wise to consider not just the
punishment of the ones neglecting deadlines, but the ‘rewarding’ of the ones who
comply sooner than requested. The flexibility of the Hungarian regulation sys-
tem would be improved by introducing the tools of ‘Voluntary Agreements’, as a
new mean of regulation. This acknowledged practice of developed countries and
member states of the European Union is practically a voluntary based agreement
between companies or corporate alliances and the state or some authorities, in order
to accomplish environmental targets. In case when an agreement is signed, the gov-
ernment agrees not to stipulate more strict condition in the future than was agreed
to, as long as the contract is in force. The other contracting party agrees to follow
the agenda of the contract, and to promulgate the contract and the achievements.
The advantages of the company are that as long as the contract is valid no further
obligations will be charged on it. Furthermore, since these contracts are subject of
common law, third party (e.g. environmental NGO) legal remedies are excluded,
what the agreement is concerned. In certain cases government may offer bonus to
the contracting party if that complies with the agreement.
At first sight these voluntary agreements are rather similar to the market of
pollution rights, but there are major differences as well. First, these negotiations do
not include the exchange of environmental quality to financial means. Secondly,
endangered or potentially endangered parties are excluded from the negotiations.
The role of government in these voluntary agreements can be considered as the rep-
resentative of the society (mainly including people suffering from the pollution).
The government can be assumed to seek the societal optimum based on the assump-
tions of the marginal cost of the damages. Voluntary agreements are more flexible
in encompassing local or vocational particularities than general decrees. However,
preparations may be the first steps of a legal measure based on the experiences
of the agreements. Flexibility of the system is enhanced, if local authorities are
involved to the negotiations. For the companies, voluntary agreements are good
advertisements, raising their reputation. On the other hand, companies denying
to sign the agreements or contravening the accepted terms will loose clients by
lowered reputation.
Experts call the attention that companies with large capital intensity may
take upon responsibilities that smaller ones are incapable to cope with, thus small
ventures will be put at a disadvantage or will be forced to undertake technological
investments above their means.
A couple of governments believe that voluntary agreements are more efficient
in fulfilling international environmental duties (e.g. CO2 emission abatement) than
any legislative tool.
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Civil society and NGOs eye this new direction distrustfully, mainly because
of the already mentioned lower capability to intervene or to represent their interest
by using legislative tools. In certain countries governments are accused to connive
with the corporations to the disadvantage of environmental interests.
The system, after all, disperses. The lack of trust is somewhat understandable
in the former socialist countries, since this form of mutual agreements is rather
similar to the negotiations of the environmental policy of the late 70’s, where bar-
gaining of the companies aimed to ease the strictness of the requirements, most of
the time successfully. Today, the situation is rather different to that of the social-
ist era. Democratically elected governments deal with private companies, while
former counterparts were dealing with corporations of their own.
It would be wise thus to keep an eye on this measure and if possible to introduce
it in Hungary.
10. Political Considerations, Societal Acceptance
This criterion represents the options of the society to choose from the available
tools, and the pool of arguments in relation to the relative correctness of the used
tools. Out of these, three are considered here to be really important: the first refers
to stabilisation of redistribution, the second to ethical stabilisation and the third to
economics stabilisation in its broadest sense.
As it is known, economic effects of regulatory tools are incentive effect (de-
pending on the amount of the fee) and redistribution effect. Environmental fines,
fees and charges all flow into large funds. The redistribution mechanism of these
funds, according to our opinion, works with unsatisfactorily low efficiency. The re-
turns of future laws, such as of the planned emission charge, would mean then large
extra income sources. This would thus make the political handling conceivably
more difficult, and the societal acceptance harder.
It could be considered an axiom that revenues from environmental fees and
charges in Hungary should be income-neutral, mainly because of the need to lower
the concentration of the Budget in the GDP. It means that the practice of separated
environmental funds will inevitably change and move into a more indirect state,
effectuated by the redistribution3 . Thus the regulation side must be more flexible
as well.
Politics and societal requirements exhibit certain consumer preferences, and
resist if forced to be rearranged. This holds in case of environmental targets and
restrictions too.
The effects of environmental policies, programmes and regulation systems
on the income brackets and the income structure are very important from political
and social acceptance point of view.
3Analysing the working principles of the regulations, it seems inevitable to examine the details of
environmental funds and the question of redistribution.
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Taxation affects households of the various income brackets differently. Ac-
cording to an EU-analysis, examining the weight distribution and the effects of
a projected energy/carbon charge related to the United Kingdom, these tax forms
would affect the poorer households beyond the average. While levying 10 USD
charge on each barrel oil would lower the consumption of the average household by
6.55%, in the lowest 20% of the income brackets the reduction would reach 10%.
It would be interesting to conduct an analysis examining the effects of taxes
on the income levels. Such study has never been accomplished in the EU, however,
the investigation to the United States can be evaluated, with minor corrections.
According to that, 100USD/tonnes of carbon is equivalent to 10% of the income in
the lowest bracket, while in the highest bracket this figure only exceeds the 1.5%
level.
Similar investigations are not performed in Hungary, thus we can only rely on
our assumptions. People with high incomes possibly would not perceive the effects
of the energy charges on their allowances, quite similarly to the situation of the
USA. However, the effects would be substantial in case of people from the lowest
bracket and in the lower middle class. This would intensify the dissatisfaction with
the tax, lowering the positive attitude of society to natural values.
From the political acceptance point of view, if eco-tax affects society on a
broad scale, policy should compensate the negative effects some way. Another
reason for compensation is if the affected group is strong and organised enough
to represent their interest against the levied tax (valid especially for a couple of
entrepreneurial groups).
To counterbalance the undesired negative effects of the distribution, two op-
tions are known: bonus and compensation.
Bonus is generally given in a form of exemption from taxes or tax refund.
The initial proposal of the European Community regarding carbon/energy charges
included six sectors of the industry exempted from the tax (steel-making, chemistry
industry, industry of non-ferrous metals, cement industry, glass and paper industry).
The bonuses will, however, reduce the effects of the tax and thus result in no or
hardly any change in the customs.
Compensation is a posterior subvention to certain groups in order to somewhat
lower the elevated levies. Analyses univocally prefer compensation to bonus, except
if compensation depends on the measures of the tax payable by firms or households.
Note, that the Hungarian concept of emission charge contains a similar com-
pensation method. Its consequences to the effectiveness are worth examining,
otherwise the regulation will comply with the European expectations but the im-
plementation will lag seriously behind.
A special way of compensation, in the European Union particularly, to lower
other levies when new eco-tax is introduced. This reduction lowers taxes, fees and
other levies on the income.
It must be considered, however, that particularly poor households pay little
tax (in Hungary many households, due to the low income level, pay no taxes at
all). Hence, if compensation is effective via taxation, the targeted poor families
will receive no or hardly any reimbursement but only rich families.
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Reimbursements may be re-directed in a way, which target the poor household
more effectively, by modifying the structure of social securities (like health insur-
ance, unemployment fees or pensions). This would than contradict to the incentive
to restructure and differentiate the taxation.
Too strict environmental regulation with unknown economic effects may put
companies at a serious disadvantage. This is another reason why this form of
regulation should be combined with the previous ones.
11. Sustainability of the Hungarian Economic and Environment Policy
The Hungarian Environmental Program for 1997–2002 defines sustainable devel-
opment as strict as the European Union environmental programme, stating that
sustainable development intends to put forward two aspects that market conditions
usually cannot properly acknowledge: the protection of natural values and the prin-
ciple of responsibility towards future generations.
The concept of sustainable development, on a long run, is in contradiction to
the short-sighted interest of the politics and economics, both emphasising ‘sustain-
able growth’.
As it is known, in today’s Hungary, the two concepts are always mentioned
together, often as interchangeable expressions. Furthermore, the practical and the-
oretical gap between the two is not identified clearly.
To put the theory of sustainable development to the level of everyday projects,
it must be clarified what type of growth on what time-span following which agenda
can be reconciled with sustainability.
I agree with the statement of Daly, saying ‘sustainable growth’ is an unsus-
tainable theory. This, however, does not imply that environmental programmes and
the environmentalists representing them, should deny growth at all time.
Below, we will take the example of Hungary and its relation to the European
Union, considering the following important features:
• The Hungarian economy used a relatively high amount of material and energy
to produce a unit of GDP in the past 50 years, thus the level of environmental
pollution was considerably high4. (Relativeness implies underdevelopment
of Hungary compared to EU level, and advantage if compared to the former
socialist countries.)
• The economy is just over a long decade of depression, and the GDP of today
is still lower than that of the 80’s, the era before the depression started.
Let us see now, whether ‘sustainable development’ and ‘sustainable growth’
contradict to each other in Hungary today.
As long as the time-span of the sustainability of ‘development’ and ‘growth’
are not the same, the two initiatives can be reconciled. However, reconciliation
4This problem is examined by the other team of our research programme.
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is only a theoretical possibility. For the implementation, a similar step would
be necessary that was done at the Amsterdam Summit of the European Union, in
1997. During this meeting, the basic theorem of the fifth environmental programme,
‘sustainable development’, was officially included to the ultimate goals of the EU.
The theorem of sustainable development is not uniformly applied to each country.
The transitional development of Hungary implies that the new political and societal
structure can only find its balance if new economy emerges.
There is theorem, said to be proved by ‘Kuznets-curve’ and the practices of
most countries of the EU and OECD, proclaiming that pollution only grows as long
as GDP reaches a certain level, and then it starts to decline. Some people conclude
that growth automatically turns into sustainable development. However, as many
researchers pointed out, the declining trend is not proved to be stable on the long
run, and the recent economic growth involves the possibility of future raise of the
pollution curve.
Economic growth utilising natural resources in a more efficient way can be
in harmony with the principles of protection of natural values and responsibility
towards future generations. However, the evolution of a more differentiated ap-
proach towards environment is inevitable. This means that, since nature provides
four ‘economic services’ to human population, namely:
• energy and resources,
• space for economy,
• neutraliser and receptor of the by-products of the human economic and social
activities,
• source of human life, recreation and recovery (recreational capital),
the simultaneous consideration of these four aspects must be the source of protection
of natural values. To bias any of the above services in order to impair the others the
functioning of the system as a whole will significantly lower.
The above facts about sustainable development and economic growth only
intended to picture this dilemma but hold true in relation to environmental and
economics development programmes, and in the relationship of environmentalists
and economic decision-makers.
As it was emphasised in line with the regulation systems, separated envi-
ronmental policy cannot help to get closer to sustainability in Hungary in the end
of the 90’s. Only economic-social-political integration of the environmental as-
pects promises good chance to move towards sustainability and thus closer to the
European Union.
Since the idea of sustainable development is one of the key issues of the
environmental policy of the European Union, furthermore, it is an increasingly
important aspect of the accession process itself, for a harmonised accession, ‘sus-
tainable development’ must be the inherent part of basic economic and social goals
of Hungary.
This requires a more complex and practical evaluation of this problem in our
future researches.
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